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The public regulation of private land use decisions has moved into the first tier of environmental 
issues in recent decades, particularly if political contentiousness forms the basis for this ranking. As air 
and water quality have measurably improved nationwide under a broad consensus that regulation is 
indeed necessary, efforts to preserve the public benefits of open space, particularly the ecological health 
of endangered species and their habitat, appear more prominently in contemporary environmental 
discourse. A coalition of environmental and “smart growth” advocates point to the heavy impact of 
continued expansion of the urban perimeter in many cities, not just the destruction and fragmentation of 
scarce biological habitat, but loss of erosion control and increased congestion. On the other side of this 
conflict are private property rights advocates, who argue that significant government restrictions on land 
use without compensation amount to “takings”, which are restricted by the Fifth Amendment to the US 
Constitution.
 ii  The surrounding debate is especially interesting to observe here in the West, where 
landowners’ rights to independent control over their land have an historical legacy from the 19
th century 
frontier. 
A primary legal foundation for government intervention in private land use decisions has been the 
federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). Along with a key 1982 amendment, the Act authorized 
the US Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service to prohibit or regulate land use found to impact 
species officially listed as endangered or threatened.
iii Implementation has evolved substantially over the 
past two decades to a stage where species and habitat conservation are an integrated effort (rather than a 
species-by-species search for violations), and more of the responsibility lies with local jurisdictions 
subject to state and federal oversight. In California, the Natural Community Conservation Planning 
(NCCP) Act of 1991 absorbed the goals of the federal and state Endangered Species Acts and granted 
oversight responsibility to the state Department of Fish and Game for the development of local habitat 
conservation plans (HCPs). With this the actual resource management planning filters to the local (and 
“ecosystem”) level as conservation plans are divided into regions, sub-regions, and finally sub-areas.  The 
sub-regional conservation plan for southwestern San Diego County is considered a model by federal 
authorities.
iv Originally adopted in 1998, the Multiple Species Conservation Program (MSCP) covers 85 
species of flora and fauna, and aims to preserve over 170,000 acres of open space within the planning 
area.
v Sub-areas plans are either completed or under review for all 12 local jurisdictions included in the 
plan.  The motivations for managing open space through such local habitat conservation plans are both 
biological and economic. Traditional enforcement of the Endangered Species Act placed substantial direct 
restrictions on landowners and potential developers, often in a manner not readily foreseen by these 
parties. Under such conditions the result is too frequently a perverse conservation incentive for 
landowners: to destroy sensitive habitat on one’s land lest it be identified as supporting a federally 
protected species and saddled with a costly easement. Environmentalists and anti-growth advocates have 
rarely felt their interests were effectively served either. The ad hoc identification of violations led to 
fractured protection of habitat, while biologists emphasize that contiguous areas—and corridors 
connecting them where possible—are of vital importance for species and ecosystem health. The 1982 
amendment to the ESA introduced the more flexible modern implementation by allowing for “incidental” 
impacts on protected species when part of a larger conservation program. The goal after all is the health 
of various species, their habitat, and the greater ecosystem. Since that can be accomplished best by 
committing the most ecologically valuable land to an open space preserve while allowing legally secure 
development on land better suited for that purpose (precisely the goal of San Diego’s MSCP), biologists 
and economists agree this is an improvement.     
In many ways local communities are ahead of state and federal authorities on land conservation. 
Sub-area plans for the MSCP refer to resource management plans in place that are fully consistent with 
the goals of the required habitat conservation plans.
vi Now handed the primary planning responsibility, 
communities are looking to more innovative and agreeable approaches to meeting the goals of the wildlife 
agencies and local demand for open space. As with other environmental policies where the compliance 
costs are essentially private and the benefits public, conflict cannot be avoided altogether. Experience 
shows however that policy designed to address the economic incentives facing landowners and residents 
can minimize conflict, accomplish environmental goals efficiently, cost effectively, and equitably, and 
will engage private parties productively rather than only punitively. To economists, a very direct approach 
is the purchase and commitment to open space of sensitive habitat using public funds. This has several 
appealing features, including a clear incentive for local landowners to conserve the natural resources on 
their land in anticipation of a possible sale to the public preserve. It requires the dedication of substantial 
local tax revenue, however, which presents real political and practical constraints. 
An alternative tool for the allocation and financing of open space is the employment of mitigation 
requirements, which legally assign responsibility for providing or protecting open space as a condition for 
new development. Traditional, “on-site” mitigation requires the developer to restore (or under some 
conditions only to preserve) land within the development site in compensation for the environmental 
impacts of the project. The goal is, appropriately, no net loss of habitat rather than no impact at all. Yet 
this type of regulation is still subject to a similar critique as other traditional land use restrictions: there is little concession to the fact that some land in a region is better suited (biologically and economically) for 
open space than other land. This logic leads to “off-site” mitigation, which allows for compliance to be 
met with preservation elsewhere in the planning area, where the biological value of open space is greater 
and/or the value of the alternative land use is smaller. A final step, one in which economists are keenly 
interested, involves the “banking” of mitigation credits in contiguous preserves and the marketing of 
credits to developers or others requiring them.         
The purpose of this paper is to outline the economic principles behind open space mitigation 
requirements and mitigation banking, and to present some conclusions regarding the prospects for their 
effectiveness as environmental policy. First the economics of property rights, non-market value, and 
market failure are briefly reviewed. From this review we recognize that while the establishment and 
enforcement of property rights are indeed important, standard economics indicates that local land use 
controls or limits on new development are valid roles for government intervention. Next mitigation 
requirements are compared with incentive-based environmental policy in other areas in an effort to 
identify the key features of good programs that can guide the design of land use policy. Finally, the 
incentives produced by mitigation requirements are analyzed more closely, with special attention to the 
determinants of market value for mitigation land in idealized and more realistic settings. 
The potential for sound resource management incentives resulting from mitigation requirements 
are excellent, but the measure of effective incentives is always in the prices. Mitigation land markets are 
only truly effective when the normally “non-market” environmental value of mitigation land is explicitly 
reflected to landowners in exchange prices with developers or mitigation “banks”. The ultimate 
evaluation of this and every approach to resource conservation therefore depends on the extent to which 
this “capitalization” of environmental value into prices occurs. 
 
The simple economics of property rights… 
The frontier spirit of the American West aside, there are excellent reasons to believe that the 
enforcement of private property rights is vital for sound management of land and other natural resources. 
Property rights advocates make the compelling point that a private owner has every incentive to protect 
her land from degradation and to make investments in conservation when doing so improves its current or 
future value. Even if only motivated by the selfish goals of asset ownership, the logic proceeds, a resource 
owner is unlikely to tolerate exploitation, mismanagement, or degradation of the quality (and value) of 
their property. Would a rancher allow cattle to devour all his grazing land at once? Would a farmer 
neglect soil conservation projects if they would improve the productivity of his field? Secure ownership 
leads to this generally reliable form of resource management through the alignment of private interest 
with resource quality and sustainability.        Indeed a closer look reveals that poor resource management is much more likely to arise in cases 
of common property, collective management, or other arrangements where ownership is incomplete or 
uncertain. Untitled or publicly owned forestland in “open access” is plundered for timber or conversion to 
agricultural uses, both historically in the US and currently in the world’s tropical areas. We say that 
resources under these circumstances suffer from the “tragedy of the commons”, an economic affliction 
that presents environmental degradation as a prominent symptom.
vii The “tragedy” is that with common 
property resources, an individual user neglects the benefits of conservation and the costs of degradation 
associated with their actions because other user absorb the greater share of the effects; an individual 
resource user among many cannot expect to appropriate the returns to their conservation effort. The 
lesson here is that resource degradation is not caused by the pursuit of profit itself, but by under-
investment in conservation resulting from incomplete ownership. 
 
…and non-market land value  
  Herein lies the source of the fundamental land management problem: some of the environmental 
effects of land use decisions are external to the owner, meaning a portion of the benefits and costs are 
borne by neighbors or the larger community. This is particularly true of rare habitat, the loss of which 
affects everyone who places value on the survival and health of locally threatened species. In the presence 
of such externalities, decisions based only on private costs and benefits may be quite different from those 
that would be made under consideration of the full social costs and benefits. When this is the case, our 
expectation that property rights will automatically align landowners’ interests with the efficient 
management of resources should be reconsidered. In fact, such externalities are kin to the tragedy of the 
commons in that landowners typically cannot privately appropriate the benefits of habitat conservation (or 
erosion control), so these investments languish. 
A brief comparison with the externalities underlying another primary environmental concern is 
revealing. A power plant, a steel mill, and an automobile are all operated by private decision makers who 
weigh the private benefits and costs of additional production or miles traveled. Yet these activities also 
generate air pollution, which potentially affects the health of a large number of people. Should we expect 
that these external costs be included in the decision calculations of firms or drivers in the absence of any 
regulation? Without passing judgment, I think as a practical matter we had better not count on it. The 
health and other costs of pollution are very real, but in the absence of any regulation a polluter isn’t faced 
with paying them. Consequently, these circumstances provide a classic economic rationale for 
government involvement, and the need for air quality standards or other regulation is now nearly 
universally accepted.   Decisions regarding land use are of course a bit different from air pollution. With land it may be 
more natural to think about a menu of potential uses—perhaps a given acre can be farmed, developed for 
residential or commercial space, or left as open space—and the best use from society’s standpoint is 
simply the one that generates the greatest net benefits. If an owner were always in a position to recover 
the value associated with all possible uses, she is automatically guided by the desire to maximize the 
value of her asset to choose this socially preferred use. If on the other hand substantial value associated 
with the land is not reflected in any market—as with open space, where the benefits accrue largely to 
community residents other than the landowner—the use providing the highest value to the owner can 
easily deviate from that which would provide the greatest social net benefits. Under these circumstances 
we cannot expect private land use decisions to always line up with the best interests of the community as 
a whole.  
And clearly for some land the greatest social value is generated by “non-market” uses: habitat 
preservation or open space. Suppose a landowner could collect fees from residents of the community (or 
beyond) who value the preservation of open space on her land, and that the obvious practical problems 
associated with collecting such fees didn’t exist. In other words, suppose a market existed for the owner 
to “sell” the environmental services her land provides to the community when it is dedicated to habitat 
preservation. Would collecting these environmental fees be a more profitable operation than some 
alternative development? If so, the community is better off with the land committed to open space, even if 
no such fee system could ever be established. The conclusion to this thought experiment rests on the idea 
that the sum of the fees people are willing to pay measures the non-market value of open space, just as 
profit from development measures the value of that land use.  
Of course, development projects pay dividends in the world outside of hypothetical thought 
experiments in a manner that providing open space rarely does. Markets for environmental services 
simply don’t naturally exist for landowners to benefit directly from this aspect of what their land is 
capable of providing. When this kind of “market failure” is present, one is compelled to conclude is that 
some kind of public action is indeed necessary to promote efficient resource management. We are left 
then with the problem facing local communities in the design of habitat conservation plans: what kind of 
public action will accomplish the goal of efficient management best? 
    
Economic incentive-based environmentalism 
The traditional first line of defense against externalities, at least from a legal perspective, is 
liability. If a landowner believes she is liable for damages resulting from groundwater contamination, for 
example, this should encourage proper caution in waste disposal on her property with some effectiveness. 
However for many of the environmental problems associated with land use, especially habitat loss, liability regulation is bound to be ineffective or inappropriate. The number of affected parties is too large 
to allow for simple litigation, and as early enforcement of the endangered species act revealed, it is a bit 
absurd to characterize as culpable what is essentially normal economic activity. The types of 
environmental problems caused by everyday activity like electricity consumption, travel, or the 
construction of commercial and residential space require a different approach—one that focuses on 
incentives. 
Lessons from four decades of environmental policy suggest the following: the best programs 
address problems at the source of the market failure, and engage private parties in conservation by giving 
them direct incentives to do so. If environmental problems boil down to a weak signal to decision makers 
regarding the true costs and benefits of their actions, as the previous section argued, the most direct 
solutions involve improving the reception of that signal. With respect to market failure associated with 
land use, this involves landowners confronting, in one way or another, the environmental value of their 
land. If individuals can appropriate sufficient benefits from conservation—or, put differently, are liable 
for the social costs associated with degradation—their land use decisions will to a greater degree reflect 
the community’s best interests.   
The logic of approaching policy at the level of incentives facing individuals and firms has been 
slow to take root in the environmental movement, but today enjoys greater acceptance than ever before. 
The US Environmental Protection Agency operates several incentive-based programs to address air 
pollution, the largest and farthest-reaching being the SO2 program created Title IV of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.
viii The program relies on a constructed market for sulfur emissions “allowances” in 
which firms emitting SO2 (primarily electricity generating facilities) must acquire permits in proportion to 
how much they emit. EPA fixes the supply of permits—and therefore total emissions—at the outset, but 
firms are free to buy and sell permits among one another. The price of permits is established in a market 
where demand derives from the cost of controlling an additional ton of sulfur emissions, and becomes the 
incentive signal: firms confront the fact that emissions are costly because it requires purchase of another 
permit. By nearly all accounts this program is a brilliant success, reducing sulfur emissions in 2000 to 
50% of the 1980 level with compliance costs significantly lower than anticipated. A program of a more 
limited geographic scope, but designed around similar logic is operated by the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District to control particulate air pollution in southern California. The next frontier for 
resource management based on market incentives is the allocation of surface water in the Southwest. 
Water prices have traditionally been set by authorities to reflect only the cost of transporting the resource 
to users, not its scarcity. Consequently some users, especially in agriculture, pay such low prices that 
direct incentives to conserve water are essentially non-existent. The establishment of markets where water rights can be exchanged, and where scarcity is reflected to users in the market price, is an old idea slowly 
gaining recognition as the best approach to rationing this precious resource.
ix  
These and other market-based programs present welcome alternatives to traditional “command-
and-control” environmental regulation based on technology mandates and other direct government control 
over resource allocation. Because individuals and firms are engaged in little or no active effort to control 
their impact on the environment, command-and-control regulation presents limited incentives to find 
more effective or cheaper ways to do so. Perhaps equally damaging is the effect poorly designed policy 
has had on the political environment: when those subject to regulation feel as if they have no avenue to 
participate or react to minimize their fiscal impacts, every aspect of their relationship with the regulator is 
degraded. The conflict between landowners and conservationists surrounding the traditional design of 
ESA enforcement and urban planning is a classic example.    
If environmental interest groups have been slow to warm up to incentive-based regulation, 
traditionally favoring more direct government control, this is at least partly due to a long-running 
miscommunication regarding the proposed role of markets in the regulatory process. Proponents of 
incentive-based environmental policy often favor using “constructed” markets to implement control in a 
flexible way. This is of course very different from relying on deregulated markets to do the job on their 
own, but I believe the “market-based” terminology has resulted in some confusion over this. As 
environmental groups have grown in funding and sophistication, this confusion has cleared substantially 
and opposition to market instruments is more likely based today on legitimate concerns regarding 
localized “hotspots” and other vulnerabilities. Several environmental interest groups have even become 
enthusiastic proponents of incentive-based regulation, including the influential Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF), and World Resources Institute (WRI). A glance at selected titles from these organizations’ 
publication lists reveals the growing consensus among the parties interested in environmental protection: 
“A Home on the Range: How Economic Incentives Can Save the Threatened Utah Prairie Dog,” (Bonnie 
et al., 2001 EDF); “An Overview of Incentive Approaches to Ecosystem Protection,” (Parker et al, 2000, 
WRI).
x  
For habitat protection and other land use control, paying close attention to incentives is perhaps 
even more important than with other environmental issues. Consider the incentives facing a landowner 
who knows her property includes rare, fragile habitat for an endangered species, but believes that 
discovery of this habitat could result in a taking without sufficient compensation. It is a horror story for 
everyone involved that she consider at all attractive the prospect of destroying that habitat before it can be 
discovered. Yet if the expected “fair market value” appraisal in an eminent domain case is less than what 
she would be willing to sell for, this is precisely the incentive presented. The value of that habitat is 
real—that is why as a community we seek to protect it. But if that value is not made explicit to the landowner, how can we expect decisions regarding its protection to be made responsibly? With this 
considerable background information in place, it is time to evaluate whether a market-based approach is 
feasible and desirable for the protection of habitat and open space.  
 
Can open space mitigation requirements create effective conservation incentives? 
  In light of the discussion thus far, this fundamental question must be the focus of any serious 
evaluation of the mitigation requirements approach undertaken by San Diego County and local 
municipalities. Effective protection of natural habitat in the region over the coming decades, almost 
certainly with continued population growth applying pressure for new development, will be a direct 
function of the incentives presented to developers and landowners. Will landowners be rewarded for 
conservation and foresight, or will they find the environmental value of their land a burden, with the 
tragic consequences suggested in the previous section?  We will see that the answer depends not only on 
the design, implementation, and enforcement of habitat conservation plans, but also on other general 
conditions permitting a viable market in mitigation land to evolve. While mitigation requirements are an 
extremely promising approach, there are still substantial institutional and circumstantial hurdles to their 
effectiveness. 
  First I will sketch an idealized picture of mitigation requirements and the trading of mitigation 
credits, followed by some cautionary remarks about their implementation. The most successful, though 
certainly imperfect, existing market for mitigation credits is that for wetlands. The federal regulations 
pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act Amendments require mitigation of any impacts associated 
with filling in or discharging waste into wetland areas.
xi Development rights are granted on the condition 
that this mitigation takes place through the restoration of former or degraded wetlands, or even the 
engineering of new wetland areas. Wetlands mitigation traditionally took place on site; if a wetland area 
was compromised by the development on one side, it was to be expanded or improved on another. Over 
the past two decades this system has evolved into a vigorous trading system focused on offsite mitigation. 
If more ecologically valuable restoration projects are available away from the development, undertaking 
one of these will produce greater overall environmental benefits as well as reduce costs for the developer. 
Put another way, allowing developers to undertake lower cost-per-acre restoration projects offsite means 
more acreage can be preserved for the same total cost. The net benefits of the regulation are improved 
because the options, both environmental and economic, are expanded. 
The evolution of wetlands “banks” is the most encouraging feature of this history. Firms and non-
profit organizations acquire land and implement the restoration, then apply for credits granted by the 
Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. EPA (who jointly enforce the Clean Water Act). These credits can 
then be sold to developers, who can shop around for the suitable quantity and classification of wetland acreage, to fulfill their mitigation requirements. The classification of wetland credits includes measures of 
habitat value, encouraging the dedication of ecologically valuable land all else equal. For most of the 
history of wetlands regulation, the EPA articulated a “no net loss” goal, implying a 1:1 mitigation ratio 
(an acre restored or created per acre developed or degraded). Encouraged by the efficiency and cost 
savings resulting from the markets in mitigation permits, in recent years this goal has been extended to 
achieve a 100,000 acre net increase in wetlands by 2005.
xii The adjustment in the stringency of the 
regulation needed to pursue this goal is simple: adjust the mitigation ratio.  
Programs requiring the mitigation of impacts to other sensitive habitat are of course capable of 
functioning in much the same way. The San Diego County Department of Planning and Land Use 
currently recognizes 13 formal and 9 informal mitigation banks possessing nearly 13,000 acres of land,
xiii 
mitigation requirements have already become central to local planning, and are a central component of the 
MSCP sub-area plans. The required open space mitigation associated with the granting of local 
development rights appears to have the potential to generate significant positive incentives for 
conservation. In an ideally functioning market for mitigation land, one pictures a landowner in San Diego 
County evaluating his land use options and concluding that, in spite of some profitable alternatives, the 
best option is to preserve or restore the habitat in anticipation of the highest bid for the land coming from 
a developer requiring mitigation land. At the same time, developers are engaged to shop for high value 
environmental land at their lowest cost. This combination guides mitigation to the land best suited for that 
purpose. The key to this vision is the capitalization of ecological services into land prices in this policy-
constructed market for mitigation credits. 
  It is worth examining this last statement more closely. How exactly does policy of this type create 
market value for ecological services? Recall that the problem was never that land in open space wasn’t 
valuable. That value is the entire point of the public action: it is precisely what we are seeking to protect! 
The problem was that no market existed to reflect that value, and to allow landowners to benefit 
financially from it. The market that is established to exchange mitigation land, and the environmental 
services it provides, fills precisely this role. The all-important incentives generated by this policy are 
embodied in the land prices prevailing in these exchanges. Just as water prices reflecting scarcity were 
seen to promote conservation in an earlier comparison, land prices in this market are the reliable incentive 
mechanism that ensures potential mitigation land is likewise treated as a scarce resource. In any properly 
functioning market, prices are a function of supply and demand. It is important then to consider what is 
behind supply and demand in a market for mitigation land, and through this to gain a better understanding 
of what determines its market value.  
The supply of suitable mitigation land is constrained not only by ecology, but also by the 
alternative economic uses of land available in the region. That is, some land is unsuitable for mitigation because it provides the wrong type of habitat, and other land is unsuitable because it is simply more 
valuable in another use. Of course this second judgment depends critically on the prevailing price of 
mitigation land: as this price increases, competing land uses begin to look less attractive to landowners by 
comparison, and more land becomes available for mitigation. This basic relationship—that the quantity of 
a good supplied to a market increases as the price in that market increases—is characteristic of supply 
curves, as Economics 101 students recall. At a given price, mitigation land will still be in shorter supply 
when the ecosystem is physically scarcer, of course, but even this ecology may not be completely 
unresponsive to price signals. Remember from the description of wetlands permit markets that most of 
what is “banked” has been restored, not just protected. In a market where high quality coastal sage scrub 
fetches a good price, investments in ecosystem restoration are potentially worthwhile as well.  
  Demand for mitigation land of course derives from the requirement that developers acquire land 
as a condition for development. If they were not required to do so, there is no demand and consequently 
can be no market. With mitigation requirements, demand clearly will depend directly on the acreage of 
approved development and the amount of mitigation required per acre. We have seen that the latter is a 
ratio set by local government policy or, more accurately, negotiated between local government and 
developers. The other key variable, development undertaken, is certainly related to regional trends in 
population and economic growth. At the micro level however it is important to recognize that planned 
development is first a response to the housing market. When new home prices increase as they have in 
San Diego County in recent years, it is no mystery why we observe a concurrent building boom. 
Developers plan new projects because they expect them to be profitable. In this proximate sense, 
conditions in the regional real estate market are the engine of demand in the market for mitigation land. 
When home prices are increasing and residential development is lucrative, developers are willing to pay 
more for the mitigation land they must acquire before cashing in. Such an increase in willingness-to-pay 
is synonymous with an increase in demand in this market.   
At this point it is tempting to regard demand as independent of the price of mitigation land 
itself—that developers will “pay whatever it takes” to acquire the mitigation land they need—but this 
would be misleading. The acquisition of mitigation land can represent a significant portion of 
development costs, and clearly more so if mitigation credits are expensive. When prices for mitigation 
land are low (or no mitigation is required at all), some development projects are bound to be economic 
that would not be under different market conditions. Make no mistake that part of the incentive structure 
of mitigation requirements is to limit marginal development by making projects more costly. Put another 
way, when developers are confronted with paying for the full environmental impact of their projects, they 
are more selective about when and where to build.      The simple analytics of supply and demand are extremely useful for understanding the 
determination of prices. All else equal, reductions in supply or increases demand result in higher market 
prices. In this way resource prices signal scarcity to market participants and allocate the resource to those 
who derive greatest economic benefit from it. From the determinants of supply and demand in this market 
described in the previous paragraphs, a combination of plentiful suitable habitat, limited alternative land 
uses, and a weak real estate market would result in low market prices for mitigation land. Under these 
conditions the supply of mitigation land is high and the demand low. A more accurate description of 
current conditions in San Diego County leads to a very different assessment. Given the rapid urbanization 
and resulting habitat disruption of recent decades, and the inflated land values associated with a fast-
growing regional economy, supply of suitable mitigation land is limited. At the same time, a market for 
new homes positively bursting at the seams certainly assures strong demand. One can only conclude that 
if such a market existed today, it would reveal potential mitigation land to be a valuable commodity 
indeed.  
 
Some realistic considerations 
  The preceding has been a rather rosy view of how the implementation of mitigation requirements 
could result in effective incentives for resource conservation. Reality presents a substantially cloudier 
view. First, for a market to function in the fluid manner described, with buyers and sellers responding 
only to market prices, there have to be a sufficient number of participants on both sides. One of the 
reasons wetlands mitigation banks have been effective is their wide geographic scope, allowing for 
developers to be matched with appropriate conservation projects outside of their immediate region. The 
more localized a market for open space mitigation, the more limited the opportunities for exchange. 
Simply put, for the incentives presented to landowners to be effective there must be a reasonable 
expectation of substantial demand in the future. Under the current circumstances buyers of mitigation 
land may possess significant market power, which puts downward pressure on exchange prices to just 
above the value of the next best alternative. This pressure of course also suppresses the accompanying 
incentives for conservation as well.  
All this argues that more widespread application of mitigation requirements is necessary before a 
vigorous market to exchange open space can evolve. Until such a day when regularly observed exchanges 
establish the market value of suitable mitigation land, the commitment of open space is likely to continue 
to take place largely through eminent domain claims in which “fair market value” is decided by arbiter or 
jury. The need for such appraisals is the clearest indication that significant barriers to efficient market 
exchange remain: mutually voluntary exchange is “fair” by definition. The incentives for resource 
conservation created by these circumstances are much dodgier. There is still strong disagreement within the appraisal community whether environmental land value should be considered in such cases.
xiv From 
the standpoint of efficient resource management, this debate is mysterious. The best appraisal of land 
being committed to open space, at least in terms of the price incentives, should involve an attempt to 
project what the market value for open space land would be if a well functioning market for the ecological 
services existed. In other words, the determinants of supply and demand analyzed in the previous section 
are precisely the factors that should be considered.      
  Finally, while we have established that the very existence of a market that will reflect the 
environmental value of land hinges on the public action of requiring open space mitigation, good land use 
governance by county and municipal authorities requires a bit more. Precisely because it is the public 
action that creates demand for mitigation land, landowner expectations regarding future policy and 
enforcement play a direct part in the determination of land prices. It is a common feature of all asset 
markets that prices depend not only on current conditions but expectations regarding future market 
conditions, and on the security of claims to the asset. If local governments demonstrate questionable 
commitment to enforcement, this will have a very real effect on prices and incentives for conservation 
today. This is not to say changes in policy by local governments are never warranted; good governance 
always requires the reassessment of the relevant benefits and costs. But the lost incentive effects of 
weakening mitigation requirements should be recognized as a genuine cost, and environmentalists would 
do well to consistently point this out. 
 
Conclusions 
  This evaluation of mitigation requirements as effective habitat protection policy has purposely 
omitted a central normative question: just how much land should be set aside? What is the appropriate 
ratio of required development acreage to open space acreage?  In establishing these levels the local 
community is making implicit tradeoffs between habitat protection, affordable housing, and local tax 
revenue used to finance a variety of worthwhile public projects. The stringency of the policy can be 
adjusted rather directly simply by changing the ratio. In other words, there remains a great deal to 
disagree over even if a consensus evolves that mitigation requirements are a good approach.  
In this sense the stringency of the habitat protection policy, a matter of adjusting the mitigation 
ratios, can be separated from the overall design of the policy. The greater lessons at this point involve the 
potential for mitigation requirements to produce a market for open space land, and through this effective 
incentive for resource conservation. I will take this opportunity nonetheless to argue that the stringency 
debate can be advanced most productively through the use of careful benefit-cost analysis. The better our 
understanding of the benefits the local community enjoys from open space, the more informed local 
governments will be in their evaluation of the relevant tradeoffs. When the stringency is calibrated correctly to maximize social benefits, the market value of mitigation land will accurately reflect the 
environmental benefits that land provides.  
If benefit-cost analysis related to public policy were easy, we might demand such a calibration. A 
more modest, but realistic expectation of local government policy is that it reallocate resources for the 
better—that it moves us in the right direction. I think we have a right to expect this standard of 
performance. Open space mitigation requirements in their current form are policy of this second variety. 
More widespread implementation and enforcement, and some careful articulation of habitat classes and 
corresponding mitigation ratios, are necessary before a market for land that genuinely reflects 
environmental value will evolve. In the meantime, this discussion has hopefully revealed that “the right 
direction” for local land use regulation requires most critically this incorporation of environmental value 
in the prices to which landowners respond. Conversely, any set of circumstances that presents landowners 
with no return to investments in conservation is just the opposite.    References 
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